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A NOTE ON THE EFFICIENCY
OF AN EDUCATIONAL VOUCHER SYSTEM
David E. R. Gay

The history of state supported education has a checkered record . The
major impetus in nineteenth century Britain came from the beneficiaries the teachers, to promote " free, equal education." (SJ And the resulting
record has been to provide costlier, monopolistic, unequal education with
the teaching establishment in state universities and public schools as major
" counselors" and beneficiaries of the government's largesse. Indeed the
teachers' lobby is usually one of the most powerful on state legislatures.
State supported education has had some successes but it has also encouraged an inefficient system to supply educational services.
Educatio n vouchers would be worth specific sums and could be
redeemed by being spent o n educational services at approved schools. They
would be denominated based upon the average cost to taxpayers of providing public schools but they could be spent at public or private educauon
institutions. They would be like modern versions of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act o f 1944 and its revisions known as the GI Bill. They could be
freely spent by the recipient. As the Friedmans (3, 171] argued, "The
perceived self-interest of the educational bureaucracy is the key obstacle 10
the introduction o f market competition in schooling."
A voucher system le11ing the recipient choo e where to spend the
voucher could greatly alter our educational system. As Tullock [4], argued
it would be a superior choice because the recipient could choose to spend the
voucher at any accredited school and still be able 10 spend it as before.
Thus, the wider range of choice would not foreclose the user's option 10
cont inue wit h the same services. State education would be less monopolistic
and wou ld have to differentiate its product. Overall costs of educa11on
would be lower due to efficient use of resources. (SI
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Currently the state subsidy is an average of $2,000 per student, per year
(3 ,160]. But in order to qualify the student must pu rchase some educational ·
services in order to receive, in effect, the subsidy on the student's behalf.
This represents the tuition paid of $400, for example. This is shown by the
budget constraint becoming BH IJK.

The distance BH represents the forfeited claim...pn other goods. If the ne~
consumer equilibrium lies along the distance between J and K, then the subsidy would be equivalent to cash. It would represent the same choice asif ,
cash had been given and could be freely spent on ed ucation or other goods,
whichever the recipient desired.
However, the present system of state subsidies may lead to the overconsumption of education. Consider a potential case shown in Figure 2 where
the subsidy led to an unstable equilibrium at J whereby the same effea
could have been achieved at a lower cost (B' B') at the combination shown at
L. T he difference in cost between the two new constraints represents the
welfare cost of the purchase requirement. In general, one would expect the
welfare cost would be lower for higher income families since they normall1
spend more on education, in an absolute measure. Paradoxically the poorer
families bear a higher welfare cost because the subsidy represents overcon•
sumption! The equivalent grant in cash would lead to an equilibrium at M
along the budget constraint KK shown in Figure 3, with a greater consump,
tion of other goods and a lower consumption of education relative to point
J . Note, however, that the recipient is better off in both cases but that the
existing system distorts choices. However, the same distortive effects ma)
occur if K characterizes unstable choices with a voucher system.
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Thus short o f transferring income, which would be spent on anything, the
voucher system could be an improvement upon the present system of financing public schools. Spending is restricted to schooling, but is less restricted
under a voucher system, as this note demonstrates.
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